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and Eastern European countries
SUMMARY: Where a country allows the free movement of capital and follows a free floating exchange rate policy, the monetary trilem-
ma would suggest the existence of monetary autonomy, which is prejudiced when external shocks cause a significant decrease
(divergence) or increase (contagion) in market co-movements. This study aims to analyse the extent to which daily changes in bond
market returns and exchange rates of the Euro area, and the monetary policy measures of the European Central Bank (ECB) influ-
enced the daily changes in the bond market returns and currencies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland between 2002 and
2011. After rejecting the efficient market hypothesis for the capital and money markets under review, a dynamic conditional corre-
lation is fitted to individual market pairs. Whether the differences between these are significant is analysed against extreme and nor-
mal daily movements in Euro area indicators. A movement is considered extreme where the empirical movement is an outlier for the
theoretical normal distribution applicable to it. Although the objective function of monetary policy in Central and Eastern European
countries is mostly aligned with that of the ECB, owing to differences in their fundamentals, collective actions taken on extreme days
caused risk premiums to increase.  Consequently, Central and Eastern European markets were much harder hit by adverse changes
in the Euro area, while the impact of the ECB’s measures to enhance liquidity was not necessarily felt. It is doubtful, however, that
the introduction of the Euro would eliminate such unfavourable phenomena.*
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IINTRODUCTION This paper aims to explain to what extent mon-etary autonomy applies in the bond and cur-rency markets of Central and Eastern Europe.
As part of its discussion of monetary policy
autonomy, our paper considers the confines
within which central banks make decisions on
base rates and liquidity. Decisions by foreign
central banks on monetary policy may influ-
ence the steepness of the yield curve and the
changes in individual maturities, while a co-
movement of certain currencies may also occur.
We will consider the impacts of the decisions of
the European Central Bank (ECB) on the
Hungarian, Czech and Polish bond and curren-
cy markets, using logarithmic first differentials
of daily closing values between 1 January 2002
and 31 July 2011.
The choice of analysing the selected Visegrád
countries is supported by the strong conver-
gence between currency rates as described in
Stávárek (2009) and Babetskaia – Kukharchuk et
al. (2008), and by Farkas’ (2011) claim that this
group of countries constitutes a separate eco-
nomic model in addition to those traditionally
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existing in Anglo-Saxon, Northern, continen-
tal and Mediterranean countries within the
European Union.
The positive steepness of the yield curve is a
result of the time value of money, from which
markets typically diverge in the event of severe
liquidity shortage or when inflation outlook
improves [inverted yield curve, which could
develop merely as a result of the Balassa–
Samuelson effect, see García –Solanes et al.
(2007) and Darvas – Szapáry (2008)]. Therefore,
to start with, we consider it worthwhile to look
at how the difference of 10-year and 3-month
returns changed in the countries of the sample
as a result of the ECB’s monetary policy deci-
sions. If ECB action taken in response to the
global liquidity shortage of late summer and
autumn 2008 caused the difference between
3M and 10Y returns to increase, then a positive
external effect is observed. 
The temporal stability of co-movement seen
in the fluctuation of yield curves and currency
rates could also be essential in both the appli-
cation of the financial innovations required for
risk management, and the execution of maturi-
ty transformation (Marsili – Raffaelli, 2006;
Eisenschmidt – Holthausen, 2010; Ondo –
Ndong, 2010; Barrel et al., 2010). As banks in
the countries of the region, although to vary-
ing extents, used foreign funds to finance the
credit expansion of the 2000s (ECB, 2008),
changes in currency market co-movements
should not be ignored. In the light of Chen and
Zhang (1997), Goetzmann et al. (2005), Szegõ
(2010), and also Obstfeld and Taylor (2002), it
is concluded that there is empirical evidence
for an increase, since the 1980s, in the co-
movement tendency of the capital markets of
real economies globally integrated through
convertibility. With the assets reviewed here,
account should also be taken of the need for
the future Euro accession, which is reflected in
institutional harmonisation on the one hand
(ECB-compliant monetary policy objectives,
exchange rate systems, definitions and
methodologies), and in market expectations
on the other. Thus, in connection with the co-
movement of returns and currencies, it is pos-
sible to look at the dynamic changes in their
co-movement over the 10-year period, and a
comparison is also appropriate to determine
whether any significant changes occurred as a
result of the crisis. We have taken a dual
approach to the phenomenon of crisis: by
comparing two time windows, and along the
extremity of volatility in Euro area indicators.
In the time window approach, we worked on
the basis of changes in the ECB base rate,
exploiting the fact that the period of interest
rate rises from 6 December 2005 to 13
October 2008 is approximately the same
length as the period of interest rate cuts
accompanying the crisis, starting on 14
October 2008 (745 and 738 trading days,
respectively). With the volatility of Euro area
indicators, the distribution function of the
logarithmic first differentials of daily values
were separated into ‘normal’ and ‘extreme’
states. Then we searched for traces of signifi-
cant changes in correlations; it is precisely
such dramatic hikes that risk management
seeks protection against. The most convenient
arrangement would be the total absence of
considerable changes in correlation on such
extreme days; however, both monetary policy
makers and other market players could face a
challenge from either weakening or strength-
ening co-movement.
Our approach to the theoretical background
of the issue is based on the findings of Bonanno
et al. (2001) concerning the three key levels of
market complexity. According to those find-
ings, market returns and standard deviations
are only approximately stationary (covariance
stability), while the autocorrelation of returns
shows a monotonic decrease prolonged for at
least 20 trading days. On the other hand, cross-
correlation exists within industries and time
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series, allowing for event-based trading due to
the synchronous interactions created. From
that follows the third rule, positing the phe-
nomenon of collective behaviour during
extreme market events, three special varieties
of which are presented in the paragraphs below:
interdependence, contagion and divergence.
Contagions referred to in literature could be
analysed following the World Bank’s1 three
approaches. According to the broad definition,
contagion is the cross-country transmission of
shocks or the general cross-country spillover
effects, whether in good times or crises. Under
the restrictive definition, contagion leads to
higher than normal correlation which is under-
pinned by fundamental links (financial links,
links resulting from cross-border production
chains, and political links) among the coun-
tries. According to the very restrictive defini-
tion, contagion occurs when cross-country
correlations increase significantly during crisis
times relative to correlations during tranquil
times.
This approach is based on an observation of
the asymmetric nature of capital market
returns (Campbell et al., 2002; Bekaert et al.,
2005) according to which assets and countries
with similar characteristics (geographical loca-
tion, sector, rating by rating agencies, etc.) are
considered homogeneous by market players,
who seek to escape from the entire homoge-
neous category in the event of a problem. The
opposite of that could be heterogenisation as
described in Bearce (2002), where market play-
ers start to pay attention to unique characteris-
tics within a group previously considered
homogeneous, and they also price this in risks.
The disintegration of a group that was previ-
ously considered homogeneous, i.e. converg-
ing, will involve a reduction in co-movement;
consequently, this phenomenon will be
referred to as divergence below.
It is appropriate therefore to define this
threefold concept in more depth. 
DEFINITION 1: Capital market contagion (1)
is defined as a significant increase in the corre-
lation mkmj between the markets mk,mj as a
result of external or internal shock rn/x (Forbes
– Rigobon, 2002; Campbell et al., 2002; Bekaert
et al., 2005):
(1)
According to Wong et al. (2010), when the
equilibrium is disrupted between the demand
and supply sides in the event of contagion, cap-
ital flows in the same direction will become
international in scale, which, combined with
increased correlation, will undermine any
defensive diversification effort (Campbell et
al., 2002). Van Royen (2002) and Markwat et al.
(2009) go even further, finding in connection
with the crises of 1997 in the Far East and of
1998 in Russia, and the 2001 dotcom crash, that
the spread of contagion does not depend on the
macroeconomic fundamentals of the country
concerned, rendering even geographical diver-
sification powerless against sudden shocks. In
any case, the Russian crisis drew attention to
high-leverage financing as a possible cause of
contagion, since the shortage of market liquid-
ity led to financing problems then as well, and
high-leverage funds withdrew simultaneously
from geographical regions which were appar-
ently not related in any way. In the crisis start-
ing in 2007, the contagion of developed finan-
cial markets was largely owed to the market of
structured products, the interbank market,
and, through de-leveraging, the liquidity chan-
nel.
It is thus appropriate to define the previous-
ly mentioned phenomenon of divergence as
follows. In his book, Bearce (2002) traces the
monetary policy background of the phenome-
non back to the 1973 failure of the Bretton
Woods system, citing, as a starting point, the
monetary trilemma of Mundell–Fleming: mon-
etary policy autonomy, free capital movement
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to converge over a period that is shorter than a
decade at most. 
DEFINITION 2: Capital market divergence
(2) is defined as a significant decrease in the
correlation mkmj between the markets mk,mj as
a result of external or internal shock rn/x:
(2)
The conditional nature of interest rate con-
vergence could pose a serious challenge to the
countries in the sample, because risk premiums
may easily increase between individual coun-
tries precisely as a result of a crisis. 
To the extent that no significant change
occurs in correlations as a result of external
shock, interdependence can be defined in line
with Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
DEFINITION 3: Capital market interdepend-
ence (3) is defined as no significant change in
the correlation mkmj between the markets
mk,mj as a result of external or internal shock
rn/x (Forbes – Rigobon, 2002):
(3)
However, determining changes in correlation
requires an organising principle, i.e. a definition
of shocks. Using the definition provided by
Jentsch et al. (2006), the extremity of events is
defined on the basis of their low probability and
high impact. An endogenous approach to
extremity involves the analysis of the impact
which an extreme event occurring in a given mar-
ket at a given time has on other markets; thus our
model is established without taking into account
exogenous factors2. In order to view heavy-tail-
ness (Alderson, 2008; Albeverio – Piterbag,
2006) as an endogenous process resulting from
the interaction of markets, markets should be
assumed to be complex. Heavy-tailness occurs
when, with daily exchange rates observed in the
market, the differences between the probability
of movements of any size and of those one mag-
nitude larger are much smaller than could be
expected with normal distribution.
HYPOTHESIS 1: As a result of monetary policy
autonomy, the divergence (4) of bond and cur-
rency markets will be observed:
(4)
Our analysis therefore aims to assess the var-
ious forms of collective actions that affect
monetary policy (contagion, divergence, inter-
dependence), and our hypothesis concerns the
phenomenon of divergence as explained by
Bearce (2002).
THE ECB’S MONETARY POLICY 
MEASURES
In the period under review, from 1 January
2002 to July 2011, it is possible to distinguish
eight main stages in the ECB’s monetary poli-
cy (see Figure 1). The ECB responded to the
crisis following the burst of the dotcom bubble
in spring 2001 by cutting its base refinancing
rate, as a result of which in 25 months the base
rate dropped by 275 basis points from the ini-
tial rate of 4.75 per cent. This is Stage A, with
the start of the period under review in the first
third. The 2.00 per cent base refinancing rate
achieved by the end of the rate cuts, subse-
quently maintained for 30 months (Stage B),
was a means of monetary stimulus.
In Stage C, the ECB raised the base refi-
nancing rate by 200 basis points to 4.00 per
cent in nine steps; these 18 months were
marked by rising commodity prices and recov-
ering growth as well as an excessive take-off in
the real estate sector. In Stage D, the ECB
maintained the base refinancing rate at a high
4.00 per cent for 13 months, responding to
banks’ insufficient liquidity and fears of dollar
devaluation and inflation, then, as of 3 July
2008, raised its rate by 25 basis points to 4.25
per cent, while the FED had been gradually
decreasing its rate since September 2007. It is
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separate Stage E owing to uncertainties sur-
rounding the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
During the crisis following that bankruptcy,
the ECB implemented extremely rapid interest
rate cuts, reducing its base refinancing rate
from an initial high of 4.25 per cent to a his-
toric low of 1.00 per cent in eight successive
steps in a mere seven months. The monetary
policy measures responding to the crisis also
included means other than interest rate cuts.
For example, with a view to reducing high
interest rate volatility, the Central Bank’s inter-
est rate corridor for refinancing operations was
narrowed from 200 to 100 basis points (main-
tained for a few months until late January
2009), while the extension of the range of col-
lateral assets accepted for lending operations
across the Euro system also served to enhance
liquidity. At the same time, to facilitate longer-
term refinancing, the US provided liquidity
denominated in USD via currency swap
arrangements. Stage E was clearly about saving
banks and the increased sovereign debt of Euro
area countries. The base rate was not cut any
further after 13 May 2009; in the 23 months
(Stage G) leading up to the end of the period
under review, the ECB kept its base rate at the
level of 1.00 per cent, while also announcing
longer-term refinancing operations maturing in
one year to provide liquidity. As a unique form
of monetary stimulus, as of 8 July 2009 the
ECB declared the European Investment Bank
(EIB) to be an approved partner in the mone-
tary policy operations of the Euro system.
Since then, the EIB has had access to refinanc-
ing funds under equal terms with any other
contracting party. According to estimates by
the EIB, this additional funding may have
resulted in up to EUR 40 billion worth of addi-
tional investments. The Euro crisis intensified
over that period.
In 2010, in the field of monetary policy, the
ECB continued the practice of tendering at
fixed interest rates without quantitative restric-
Figure 1 
CHANGES IN THE ECB'S BASE RATE
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tions. Then, in May 2010, responding to ten-
sions in the financial markets, the ECB inter-
vened in the secondary market sovereign bonds
and other debt securities issued in the Euro
area. At the end of the period (Stage H), from
13 April 2011, the base rate was raised to 1.50
per cent in two steps as a result of uncertainties
about the Euro (note, however, that as of 14
December 2011 the rate has since been lowered
again to 1.00 per cent).
To test the impact of the ECB’s monetary
policy, we chose two intervals out of the eight
stages discussed above, both of which are
approximately the same length. The first com-
prises the 34 months from 6 December 2005 to
14 October 2008 (corresponding to Stages C,
D and E), clearly characterised by liquidity
absorption. The second selected interval is
linked to the financial crisis of 2008, covering
the 36 months of monetary easing from 14
October 2008 to July 2011.
METHODOLOGY – STATISTICAL 
EVIDENCE FOR CONTAGIONS
To draw conclusions concerning the statistical
and dynamic properties of extreme events, rn/x
and the alternative market model allowing for
the occurrence of contagions are introduced,
following which statistical evidence is consid-
ered for or against contagions in the markets
under review. In each case, the lead market mv
is represented by the German (Euro area) pat-
tern (mv), while the follower markets are the
selected Central and Eastern Europe markets. 
Figure 2 
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The calculation process is summarised in
Figure 2. In performing descriptive statistics,
the sample is used to highlight the problems
arising from poor market efficiency, limited
rationality and scale-free networks. As part of
GARCH fitting, which represents the first part
of analytical statistics, the distortions revealed
by descriptive statistics (autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity) are eliminated; then, fol-
lowing the calculation of dynamic conditional
correlation, extreme and normal events are sep-
arated, and the hypothesis is tested.
Our work is based on the Matlab software,
in which we carried out time series analysis
using the UCSD GARCH and Oxford MFE3
packages developed by Dr. Kevin Sheppard
(Oxford).
Testing market efficiency
In our analysis of the interaction of markets,
we first verify the efficiency of the markets
under review using the definition provided by
Fama (1970). If only poor market efficiency
were to be observed, we could not use past
prices to draw conclusions about future
changes. Then, from a statistical perspective,
future prices would be best predicted on the
basis of present prices, which is called random
walk (5):
rt=rt–1+ t, (5)
where t represents the impact of new infor-
mation (information shock), and rt represents
the pricing of the asset at t point in time. This
is to assume that returns have a normal distri-
bution, are stationary, non-autocorrelated and
homoscedastic.
The Jarque–Bera test was used to test normal
distribution, the augmented Dickey–Fuller test
(ADF) to test stationarity, and the Ljung–Box
and ARCH–LM tests to demonstrate autocor-
relation and heteroscedasticity based on Jentsch
et al. (2006), Alexander (2008) and Lütkepohl
(2004).
Fitting dynamic conditional 
correlation following elimination 
of heteroscedasticity
According to Forbes and Rigobon (2002), cor-
relation in a specific time window or rolling
correlation could be distorted by heteroscedas-
ticity; to eliminate such distortion, based on
Bollerslev (1990) and Tsay (2005), univariate or
multivariate GARCH models can be applied,
the standardised error terms of which can
already be used to calculate distortion-free,
temporally constant and unconditional correla-
tion (Chan, 2002).
In the generalised ARCH (GARCH) model
(6), lag length is represented by , the ARCH
process by 2 and q, the impact of present news
on conditional variance by 2, i, while volatil-
ity persistence, i.e. the shock of recent news 
to old information, by i (Davidson –
MacKinnon, 2003):
i i (6)
A distinction is made between symmetric and
asymmetric models, and nonlinear responses
can also be incorporated4. In our work, we relied
on the interdependency of the APARCH–GJR-
GARCH–TARCH–GARCH models in order to
use a variety of parameters to fit these to the
time series considered, then to select the model
with the best fit suitable for eliminating auto-
correlation and heteroscedasticity from error
terms. Each model and its application is
explained in more detail in the Appendix to this
paper. Once heteroscedasticity is eliminated, it
becomes possible to use the DCC–GARCH
model constructed by Engle (2002).
The DCC model (7, 8) relies on the returns
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0 and a normal distribution, as well as a covari-
ance matrix marked Ht.
rt t–1-N(0,Ht) (7)
Ht /DtRtDt (8)
where rt is a KH1 vector; Ht is a conditional
covariance matrix; Rt is a kHk time-variable cor-
relation matrix; and all information available at
a t–1 point in time is contained in t–1 whereas
Dt represents a kHk diagonal matrix containing
the time-variable standard deviations of a uni-
variate GARCH model (Kuper–Lestano, 2007;
Wong-Li, 2010).
To compare the correlations registered in
normal and extreme periods, we used a variance
test, the Ansari–Bradley test. To ensure that
the test can be carried out, we performed,
based on Lukács (1999), Fischer transforma-
tions (9) on the correlations:
zi=0,5H (9)
As part of the Ansari–Bradley test, we com-
pare two independent samples of different
length, assuming that they are from the same
probability distribution, in contrast with the
alternative hypothesis, under which they only
have similar medians and forms, but distribu-
tions with different variances. If H=0, the two
samples are similar, whereas if H=1, they are
significantly different.
Separation of extreme and normal values
In connection with the statistics of extreme
values, Jentsch et al. (2006) raise the question of
where to draw a limit of probability beyond
which a given event is considered extreme. To
test our hypothesis, we need some organising
principle which enables the correlations in our
sample to be separated (10) into ‘normal’ and
‘extreme’ groups based on the extremity of the




k = , (10)
where is the value of correlation fitted to
daily closing returns, rx+ is the lowest
extreme return (positive swing point), rx– is
the highest extreme return (negative swing
point), while x and n represent the correla-
tion grouped according to extreme and nor-
mal returns.
To that end, an evaluation is needed first as
to whether the generally accepted and used
methods described so far are suitable for the
test, which is followed by an explanation of the
organising principle created based on the above
(see Table 1).
Therefore, to allow for a definition of the
swing points for returns rx
+ and rx
– which we
are seeking, it appears appropriate to resort to
the original idea of mixed distributions involv-
ing the subdivision of the underlying distribu-
tion model. A certain extent of heavy-tailness
of empirical distributions has been demonstrat-
ed, only we have no general form that is well
fitted to any capital market. Nevertheless, the
near-equilibrium of the capital market can still
be described using average oriented models;
assuming normal distribution in such a case is
probably not very wide of the mark.
Ultimately, the separation of extreme events rx
corresponds to the definition of tails, which,
from the perspective of average oriented mod-
els, is done by separating the tails upwards and
downwards from the sections of theoretical
and actual distributions after fitting a theoreti-
cal normal distribution. Heavy-tailed distribu-
tion is characterised by tails consisting of out-
lier elements which are separated from ‘nor-
mality’, referred to in this paper as ‘extreme
events’.
In the case of asymptotic stationarity, the
periods observed may have differing character-
istics, i.e. volatility could become compressed,
while the existence of such ‘unexpected’ peri-
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tion. On those grounds, it is pertinent to raise
the question whether the
rn–x
mv
state of a focal, or mv lead market influences
the co-movement of the other markets.
The research question is ultimately con-
cerned with determining a market the normal
and extreme (n/x) states of which are suitable
to identify contagion under our definition,
where the notable events E1, E2 and E3 are
defined. Additionally, suppose that mk,mj rep-
resents the set of combinations situated above
the main diagonal from the matrix comprising
all the possible combinations of the markets
1…,j,k,…n, which in the case of n
mk,mj and
x
mk,mj have been separated by normal and
extreme returns. As a first step, let us assume
that output can only be situated between the
extremes of significantly different correla-
tions [contagion and divergence – E1(11)]




where rmi is the movement of market i, and
mk,mj is the correlation of markets k and j
along normal and extreme groups. That is, the
emergence of either contagion/divergence or
interdependence is observed, depending on the
normal and extreme state of the lead market
selected.
It follows from the foregoing that the sep-
aration of a finite number of discrete correla-
tions (co-movements of market pairs) avail-
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Table 1 
DISTRIBUTIONS AND METHODS GENERALLY ACCEPTED AND USED TO DESCRIBE 
EXTREME EVENTS 
Name of Description of distribution/method Limitations in defining extreme events
distribution/method
Normal distribution light tail, complex=random light tail
Families of power-law suitable for capturing heavy-tailness and does not offer an organising principle to determine
and stable distributions extreme events the point beyond which events are considered 
extreme
EVT, GEV, Fisher-Tippet definition of groups within an ordered population, the number and size of the groups are determined 
selection of minimum and maximum values on an arbitrary basis
within each group
VaR a probabilistic approach in general use, it aims to minimise potential loss rather than to 
a procedure generally accepted by capital market define extreme events, as a result of which the 
players and the Basel II Regulations definition of the probability limit is arbitrary
POT-GPD returns must be above/below a limit, marked by u, parametrisation is ambiguous
to be considered extreme
Q–Q plot a graphical representation of the goodness of fit of the method is not used to identify extreme events
normal distribution fitted to empirical distribution, 
allowing identification of a point beyond which 
movements registered in the market are seen as 
outliers for expected normal distribution
Source: own editing based on Tsay (2005), Kotz and Nadarjah (2000), Jajuga and Papla (2005)
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done relative to the total number of varia-
tions of the markets in the sample. For that
purpose, it is useful to introduce a third case
[E3 (13)] halfway between the extremes,
which is not classifiable. Owing to ‘non-clas-
sifiability’, the case comprises significantly
different correlations (to the extent that the
correlations of markets i=1…k…l…n are




suggesting interdependence which are not




It is important to underline that in reality,
the tailed5 nature of extreme events will yield
‘negative extreme and normal’ and ‘positive
extreme and normal’ correlation pairs.
Practical applicability also requires that
once correlations separated by the lead mar-
ket have been compared, we should not insist
on an extreme definition of contagion or
interdependence according to E1 and E2, but
perform a more general classification (see
Figure 3), which allows contagions and diver-
gences to be construed in the interval [E3,
E1], and interdependence on interval [E2,
E3]. This makes it possible to rank the output
of correlations separated by the n/x states of
the lead and other markets.
Subsequently, as a final step, the interval [E3,
E1] characterised by significantly different cor-
relations should be further subdivided to sepa-
rate contagions and divergences. Under the
definition of contagion, the ratio of significant-
ly higher correlations to all correlations should
reach at least 50 per cent. Cases below 50 per
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CLASSIFICATION OF A GIVEN MARKET INTO THE CATEGORIES OF ‘CONTAGION’, ‘DIVERGENCE’
AND ‘INTERDEPENDENCE’ BASED ON THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF CORRELATION PAIRS
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TESTING THE MODEL ON THE MARKETS
UNDER REVIEW
In this section, we seek to present our findings
concerning the impact which the synchronous
effects resulting from collective behaviour have
on the monetary policy environment in each
type of market, to establish homogeneity or
heterogeneity within each type of market, and
to determine whether lead and follower mar-
kets exist. Following the presentation of
descriptive statistics, we explain how each
GARCH model can be fitted. After that,
dynamic conditional correlations (DCC)
between markets are calculated, which is fol-
lowed by an assessment of the tendency of each
market for extreme volatility so that the capital
market contagions and divergences in the peri-
ods under review can be identified and
described using the method which we
explained previously. At the end of the section,
we evaluate the hypothesis of our work.
Liu et al. (1998), Chen-Zhang (1997) and
Heathcote – Perri (2004) all point out that in
real economies, capital markets are subject to a
regional segmentation which is similar to that
described by Viturka et al. (2009) and Lengyel
(2006). In our analysis of contagion in capital
markets, therefore, we followed a hierarchical
logic based on the dominant role of interna-
tional focal points to select the range of mar-
kets to review. The use of USD to express
exchange rates in analyses of interactions
between markets is suggested by Babetskaia –
Kukharchuk et al. (2008) and Stavárek (2009).
Rejecting market efficiency
The efficiency of the markets under review can be
rejected, as they do not show the statistical prop-
erties described in section 3.1: normal distribu-
tion, non-autocorrelation, and homoscedasticity
(see Table 2). Clearly, the probability distribu-
tion of logarithmic returns does not follow a
normal distribution in any of the cases, while
leptokurtosis is far from the expected value of
3, which suggests heavy-tailness and a great
number of extreme movements. The negative
value of asymmetry represents a left slant in
probability distribution, which indicates a
higher ratio of foreign currency gains in cur-
rency markets, and, through reduced returns,
of monetary relief in the bond market. In bond
markets, with most 3M returns, there is more
room for monetary easing, except for the
Hungarian market. Conversely, in the 10Y
market values approximate 0 or are positive, a
sign of monetary tightening. In currency mar-
kets, overall gains are observed, which could be
construed as an impression of trends preceding
2008.
The ADF test suggests that logarithmic
returns are stationary; however, most of the
time series considered show signs of both het-
eroscedasticity and autocorrelation, which con-
firms the necessity of using GARCH models.
The presence of heteroscedasticity indicates
clustered market volatility6, underlining the
importance of the phenomena resulting from
the occurrence of extreme returns.
Fitting dynamic conditional 
correlation
Once the poor efficiency of markets has been
confirmed, it is appropriate to explain the
GARCH models that have been fitted success-
fully to eliminate at least heteroscedasticity
from the time series considered. The method-
ology section describes 21 compositions of
four models.
As shown in Table 3, more serious asymmet-
ric models were needed mostly for the bond
markets, whereas with currency markets, sim-
pler models using less lag were sufficient to
eliminate adequate goodness of fit and het-
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Table 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF LOGARITHMIC RETURNS REGISTERED IN 
THE MARKETS UNDER REVIEW  
Markets Asym- Leptokur- Normal distribution Stationarity test Heteroscedas- Autocor
under review metry tosis test (Jarque–Berra (ADF-test) ticity (ARCH-LM) (Ljung–Box)
1 lag 1 lag 1 lag
p t value critical value p p
EURO 3M –0,0200 42,0711 0,001 –51,223* –1,9416 0,0000 0,2245***
HU 3M 1,3047 85,5834 0,001 –50,208* –1,9416 0,0000 0,8346***
CZ 3M –3,9396 63,4792 0,001 –46,990* –1,9416 0,8460** 0,0033
PL 3M –0,7997 37,5076 0,001 –44,166* –1,9416 0,0334 0,0000
EURO 10Y 0,0321 4,9600 0,001 –46,933* –1,9416 0,0000 0,0016
HU 10Y 0,3541 14,6869 0,001 –47,682* –1,9416 0,0000 0,0171
CZ 10Y –1,6999 63,9912 0,001 –49,120* –1,9416 0,0000 0,3756***
PL 10Y 0,6234 16,2843 0,001 –42,228* –1,9416 0,0000 0,0000
DAX 0,1070 8,2694 0,001 –52,259* –1,9416 0,0000 0,0276
BUX –0,0930 9,9225 0,001 –47,662* –1,9416 0,0000 0,0178
PX –0,5618 17,8663 0,001 –46,496* –1,9416 0,0000 0,0003
WIG –0,2971 6,2382 0,001 –46,363* –1,9416 0,0000 0,0002
EUR/USD –0,1148 5,2043 0,001 –49,713* –1,9416 0,0000 0,8173***
HUF/USD –0,4760 7,2750 0,001 –50,685* –1,9416 0,0000 0,4640***
CZK/USD –0,2709 5,5867 0,001 –48,062* –1,9416 0,0000 0,0573***
PLN/USD –0,1601 8,5734 0,001 –50,046* –1,9416 0,0000 0,9433***
*: Stationary time series, **: Homoscedasticity, ***: Non-autocorrelation
Source: own editing
Table 3
FITTING GARCH MODELS TO THE TIME SERIES 
CONSIDERED 
Asset  AIC GARCH- Parameters ARCH-
under model LM
review
EUR 3M 1,6261 aparch112 0,0210 0,1985 (1) –0,2413 (1) 0,2612 (1) 0,5401 (2) 2,1090 1*
HU 3M 1,3282 aparch222 0,2087 0,2031 (1) 0,2864 (2) 0,3180 (1) –0,3249 (2) 0,0000 (1) 0,5103 (2) 0,7890 1*
CZ 3M 1,2870 aparch111 0,0547 0,0157 (1) –0,9995 (1) 0,9371 (1) 0,4887 1*
PL 3M 0,7049 aparch112 0,1502 0,3115 (1) –0,2915 (1) 0,1940 (1) 0,3894 (2) 0,6995 1*
EUR 10Y 1,5155 gjr111 0,0036 0,0115 (1) 0,0403 (1) 0,9666 (1) 1*
HU 10Y 1,5723 aparch112 0,0836 0,2116 (1) 0,2014 (1) 0,2997 (1) 0,4807 (2) 1,4632 1*
CZ 10Y 1,4797 aparch112 0,5358 0,0056 (1) 0,9994 (1) 0,0502 (1) 0,4051 (2) 3,9999 1*
PL 10Y 0,9395 garch23 0,0001 0,2796 (1) 0,0000 (2) 0,2645 (1) 0,0807 (2) 0,3750 (3) 1*
EUR/USD 0,9431 garch11 0,0023 0,0468 (1) 0,9490 (1) 1*
HUF/USD 1,3254 gjr112 0,0449 0,0548 (1) 0,1098 (1) 0,1467 (1) 0,6939 (2) 1*
CZK/USD 1,1220 garch11 0,0036 0,0436 (1) 0,9512 (1) 1*
PLN/USD 1,2732 aparch112 0,0240 0,1140 (1) -0,3081 (1) 0,3790 (1) 0,4950 (2) 1,462 1*
Note: *: the standardised error term is homoscedastic
Source: own editing
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eroscedasticity. Another unique result is the
major role of volatility persistence, symbolised
by .: in a large part of the sample; a far greater
number of past terms had to be involved with a
definitely larger weight than in the case of nov-
elties, symbolised by . Monetary policy there-
fore must cope in a market where uncertainty,
measured by the volatility of indicators, rein-
forces itself in times of crisis.
The dynamics of correlation are different for
each type of market (see Figure 4): 3M markets
fluctuate around non-correlation, whereas with
10Y markets, varying degrees of co-movement
are observed between market pairs. In the con-
text of currency markets, we can capture
exchange rate convergence, considered in more
depth by Stavárek (2009) and Babetskaia–
Kukharchuk et al. (2008), which continued
even after the 2008 crisis. With 3M returns,
correlation fluctuates around an expected value
approximating 0, while swings also remain out-
side the range of stronger co-movement or ret-
rograde movement. This means that in such a
case, the behaviour of yield curves is fairly
autonomous, and a diversified portfolio can be
successfully created. On the other hand, there
is no sign at all of convergence by Central and
Eastern European countries (albeit even the
convergence stipulation of the Maastricht cri-
teria applies to 10Y maturities).
With 10Y returns, a certain degree of volatil-
ity is already seen between non-correlation and
co-movement in respect of the entire sample.
Hungary is an outlier; its previous slight co-
movement with the Euro area turned into ret-
rograde movement as a result of the crisis.
Previously, the Czech and Polish markets
showed some form of weaker or stronger co-
movement prior to the crash of Lehman
Brothers (marking the onset of the crisis);
however, this has been negated by global liq-
uidity shortage. The co-movement of the three
Central and Eastern European markets fluctu-
ates around 0.1–0.2. Overall, it is concluded
that the 10Y maturity does produce the crisis-
induced divergence referred to in the introduc-
tion; that is, in the EU, previously considered
homogeneous to some extent, fundamental dif-
ferences lead to the heterogenisation of market
pricing. This, of course, also means that the
measures taken by developed countries to
increase liquidity failed to take effect in the
bond markets of Central and Eastern Europe;
there was no co-movement in the 3M market
anyway, and it became looser in the 10Y mar-
ket.
The credibility of future Euro accession is
confirmed by converging long-term returns as
well as a closer co-movement of currencies; so
that since March 2008, none of the Central and
Eastern European countries has had an ERM 2
type exchange rate regime. Despite that, the
HUF has shown a surprisingly stable co-move-
ment with the EUR, CZK and PLN. 
It can thus be concluded that market co-
movement clearly fluctuates around some spe-
cial value; however, the multitude of outlier
values underlines the question of what happens
in the event of extreme market volatility.
In the section explaining the statistical prop-
erties of extreme events, we highlighted their
insignificant proportion to the size of the
entire sample, and their temporal clustering.
Table 4 shows that the weight of returns on the
tails of probability distribution, which we iden-
tified as extreme, does not exceed 5 per cent in
any of the markets.
With 3M returns, the greatest number of
extreme events occurred on the positive side as
a result of monetary easing. Within this type of
market, the Hungarian market was the most
sensitive, having the highest ratio of extreme
contraction, followed by the Euro area and
Poland. The American data could be misleading
in this case, as some of the fluctuations seen
here are rather extreme. It is appropriate to
treat the data for the Euro area and Poland sep-
arately because in the former, only spikes of
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Figure 4 
DYNAMIC CONDITIONAL CORRELATION (DCC) IN THE TIME SERIES CONSIDERED
Source: own editing
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over six per cent are considered extreme,
whereas one-sixth of that size counts as
extreme in the Polish market. All this casts a
new light on Hungarian vulnerability; in
Hungary, an event is considered extreme if it
reaches three times the volatility registered in
the Polish market and twice that registered in
the Czech market, i.e. this market is much
more volatile to begin with, and also has tails
with a larger weight of extreme returns. 
The markets of 10Y returns are already less
exposed to monetary policy and the flow of
short-term liquidity; however, the Hungarian
market shows a weight of extreme movements
similar to that in lead markets, which, owing to
an asymmetry similar to that of 3M returns, pri-
marily take the form of monetary tightening.
As in the 3M market, the threshold of extreme
volatility is the highest in the American market
with 3.2 per cent, although the differences are
smaller here; in the Czech market the threshold
is 1.57 per cent, whereas in the Hungarian and
Polish markets the values on the positive side
are higher than those of the Euro area. 
Currency markets are dominated by extreme
gains with all four pairs, which could be attrib-
uted to the lows of the dollar in the 2000s.
Indeed, in the period preceding the 2008 events,
the currencies of Central and Eastern European
countries also gained against the Euro, while in
the crisis they lost within a rather short time,
i.e. a smaller number of declining returns are
registered. Another characteristic is that the
swing points of Central and Eastern European
countries tend to coincide, distributed around 
1 per cent on the positive side, and around 4 per
cent on the negative side.
Table 5 shows the diagnostics of extreme-
normal separation, comparing, based on
Pukthuanthong and Roll (2011), the leptokurto-
sis of the full sample to that of the population
which is considered normal. As ‘normal’ has
been defined as volatility within the normal
distribution, it is not surprising that the lep-
tokurtosis of this sub-sample approximates the
value of three, which is considered ideal.
Difference in market characteristics
before and during the crisis
Table 6 compares the changes of the markets in
the sample on the basis of two time windows,
one characterised by rising and the other by
falling base rates. In the course of crisis man-
agement, the level of short-term returns fell
substantially only in the Euro area and the
Czech market, while in the Hungarian and
Polish markets it failed to do so even with a
higher standard deviation. With longer maturi-
Table 4 
PROPERTIES OF NORMAL AND EXTREME EVENTS 
Market under EUR 3M HU 3M CZ 3M PL 3M EUR 10Y HU 10Y CZ 10Y PL 10Y EUR/USD HUF/USD CZK/USD PLN/USD
review
number 60 73 23 60 103 91 33 85 29 34 29 39
extreme „+”% 2.40 2.92 0.92 2.40 4.12 3.64 1.32 3.40 1.16 1.36 1.16 1.56
r 6,201 3,054 2,278 1,192 2,144 2,559 2,628 1,57 1,555 2,309 1,966 2,227
normal 2,395 2,399 2,457 2,356 2,334 2,357 2,439 2,344 2,395 2,353 2,367 2,359
number 48 31 23 87 66 55 31 74 77 114 105 103
extreme „–”% 1.92 1.24 0.92 3.48 2.64 2.20 1.24 2.96 3.08 4.56 4.20 4.12
r –6,694 –3,164 –2,028 –1,143 –2,433 –2,895 –2,647 –1,616 –1,239 –1,738 –1,401 –1,748
Note: yields: number of yields; % ratio of yields compared to total yields; r: yield interpreted as a threshold of extremity
Source: own editing
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ties, none of the Central and Eastern European
countries had its returns reduced; in this case,
the countries were already unable to leverage
the monetary easing implemented in the Euro
area. The extent of market liquidity and the
sustainability of maturity transformation can
be inferred indirectly from the 10Y–3M spread,
which provides a good expression of the time
value of money. That will cast a new light on
our previous impression, with increased steep-
ness in the yield curves of Central and Eastern
European countries (and reduced standard
deviations in spreads) during the ECB’s mone-
tary easing. It is thus concluded that although
the level of base rates is not directly influenced
by the ECB’s monetary policy, its role in
increasing liquidity is felt to a certain extent.
In interval B, the EUR continued to gain on
average, in contrast with the losses of the HUF
and the PLN; surprisingly, the standard devia-
tion of the currencies was reduced during the
crisis. It should be added that before the crisis,
Table 5 
LEPTOKURTOSIS OF NORMAL AND EXTREME EVENTS
EUR3M HU3M CZ3M PL3M EUR10Y HU10Y CZ10Y PL10Y EUR/ HUF/ CZK/ PLN/
USD USD USD USD
full 
sample 42,0711 85,5834 63,4792 37,5076 4,9600 14,6869 63,9912 16,2843 5,2043 7,2750 5,5867 8,5734
normal 
state 7,7186 6,4723 6,1227 4,7224 2,6747 3,7812 4,3682 3,4725 2,7427 2,8684 2,7738 2,8646
Source: own editing
Table 6 
AVERAGE RETURNS AND CURRENCY MARKET VOLATILITY BEFORE (INTERVAL A) 
AND DURING THE CRISIS (INTERVAL B) 
EUR HU CZ PL
3M returns Average in interval A 3,5003 7,5218 3,0487 4,8834
Standard deviation in interval A -0,361 0,7361 0,5813 0,8121
Average in interval B 0,7093 6,9252 1,8194 4,2992
Standard deviation in interval B 0,2983 3,5459 0,7010 0,5364
10Y returns Average in interval A 4,0302 7,2212 4,2229 5,5631
Standard deviation in interval A 0,0954 0,3768 0,2221 0,1818
Average in interval B 3,0693 8,0788 4,2510 6,0088
Standard deviation in interval B 0,1264 1,6655 0,2821 0,0931
10Y–3M spread Average in interval A 0,5298 -0,3007 1,1743 0,6798
Standard deviation in interval A 0,1770 0,4704 0,1673 0,3369
Average in interval B 2,3600 1,1537 2,4316 1,7095
Standard deviation in interval B 0,2867 0,9540 0,5249 0,5545
Foreign exchange Average in interval A 1,3660 0,0054 0,0506 0,3692
Standard deviation in interval A 0,0138 0,0000 0,0001 0,0028
Average in interval B 1,3664 0,0050 0,0537 0,3352
Standard deviation in interval B 0,0052 0,0000 0,0000 0,0006
Source: own editing
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the currencies of the region gained against the
EUR, while during the crisis, they sustained
occasionally abrupt losses, which, however, is
not reflected in this form of the data.
The co-movement of returns did not neces-
sarily change significantly as a result of the cri-
sis, which could make the job of the central
banks and market players concerned easier, as
shown in Table 7. Typically, this insusceptibili-
ty developed mostly for the less liquid 10Y
maturity and within the region, while, with one
exception, there is always a significant differ-
ence from Euro area returns. The 3M market
mostly remained uncorrelated, coupled with
higher variance, i.e. in the short term, positive
or negative co-movement at 0.4 could easily
occur, as shown previously in connection with
dynamic conditional correlation. With 10Y
returns, the market apparently did not price in
interest convergence for each Euro candidate;
indeed, as a result of the crisis, even the previ-
ous limited co-movement of the Czech market,
considered a safe haven, became looser.
Consequently, divergence should rather be
expected to occur in the case of 10Y maturities. 
The situation is even more dramatic with
respect to the co-movement of currency mar-
kets, where an increase in the previously strong
correlation is observed. Overall, the crisis led
to disintegration in regional bond markets and
to integration in regional currency markets.
Therefore, with sovereign risks, the emphasis
shifted from catching up and convergence to
the differences in local fundamentals.
Difference in market characteristics
before and during the crisis
Following the definition of extreme events
and the calculation of correlation between
markets, it is worth addressing the demon-
Table 7 
REARRANGEMENT OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MARKETS BEFORE (INTERVAL A) 
AND DURING THE CRISIS (INTERVAL B)  
EU-HU EU-CZ EU-PL HU-CZ HU-PL CZ-PL
3M returns
Ansari–Bradley test between intervals A and B 0 1 1 1 0 1
Average in interval A –0,017 0,0110 –0,014 0,0357 0,0757 0,0875
Standard deviation in interval A 0,0005 0,0029 0,0005 0,0003 0,0016 0,0019
Average in interval B –0,015 0,0171 –0,010 0,0305 0,0702 0,0520
Standard deviation in interval B 0,0006 0,0060 0,0007 0,0009 0,0014 0,0033
10Y returns
Ansari–Bradley test between intervals A and B 1 1 1 0 0 0
Average in interval A –0,044 0,4480 0,1575 0,0757 0,2271 0,1826
Standard deviation in interval A 0,0026 0,0107 0,0143 0,0037 0,0032 0,0073
Average in interval B –0,129 0,1697 0,0197 0,2441 0,0991
Standard deviation in interval B 0,0009 0,0229 0,0220 0,0047 0,0038 0,0072
Foreign exchange
Ansari–Bradley test between intervals A and B 0 0 0 1 0 0
Average in interval A 0,7444 0,8305 0,7537 0,7168 0,8326 0,7642
Standard deviation in interval A 0,0105 0,0026 0,0066 0,0141 0,0049 0,0059
Average in interval B 0,8102 0,8800 0,7996 0,8292 0,8718 0,8356
Standard deviation in interval B 0,0060 0,0039 0,0068 0,0046 0,0028 0,0030
Forrás: own editing
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strability of collective actions (contagion and
divergence) (see Figure 5). Assuming extremi-
ty in the volatility of Euro area assets, the full
sample will show divergence in the case of
increasing returns and losing currencies. With
the sub-samples described earlier (intervals A
and B), the already close correlation was sig-
nificantly reinforced on days when the EUR
lost significantly, that is, a loss of confidence
affected the Euro area and its orbit at the same
time. 
In the case of returns, dried up markets were
coupled with a significant reduction in correla-
tion for both maturities. It is a different issue
that with 3M, divergence was not demonstrable
before the crisis, while it was during the crisis.
However, with 10Y, no significant correlation
change can be demonstrated that is coupled
with extreme monetary tightening either
before or during the crisis. That is, irrespec-
tively of our previous finding of considerable
co-movements between 10Y returns, extreme
hikes do not lead to synchronous effects on a
daily basis.
On days of extreme EUR gains, only inter-
dependence is observed over the entire period;
however, the two sub-samples already show
divergence. The sudden EUR gain thus did not
pull the other currencies; the positive shock
failed to spill over (see Figure 6). At times of
Figure 5 
DEMONSTRABILITY OF CONTAGION, DIVERGENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE WITH THE NOR-
MAL AND EXTREME STATES OF THE MARKETS UNDER REVIEW, CONSTRUING EXTREMITY
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monetary easing, divergence is seen only on the
entire sample, whereas sub-samples failed to
produce the same effect. That is, despite a sud-
den increase in liquidity in the bond markets of
the Euro area, there was no co-movement
between Central and Eastern European mar-
kets on that day.
SUMMARY
The autonomy of monetary policy becomes lim-
ited when, as a result of collective action evolv-
ing in the markets, co-movements of significant-
ly varying degrees occur. We have constructed a
diagnostic model for such observations, as
part of which first we reject the principle of
market efficiency and random walk by testing
the normal distribution, non-autocorrelation
and homoscedasticity of market movements.
In the second step, we compared the condi-
tional correlations of market movements
derived from various GARCH (Generalized
Autoregression Heteroscedasticity) models and
obtained through Fischer transformation, in
the extreme and normal states of the lead mar-
ket. There are two main approaches to the
analysis of financial time series; average ori-
ented models look at the expected value and
variance of probability distribution, whereas
Table 6 
DEMONSTRABILITY OF CONTAGION, DIVERGENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE WITH THE 
NORMAL AND EXTREME STATES OF THE MARKETS UNDER REVIEW, CONSTRUING 
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extreme value models are concerned with the
tails (fat-tailness or heavy-tailness) of the dis-
tribution7, and its maximum and minimum
values. In this paper, we sought to offer a diag-
nostic analysis of the latter. 
The bond market, compared to either cur-
rency or equity markets, is more of an oligopo-
listic and regulated market owing to the domi-
nance of institutional actors and the actions of
monetary policy (this is also confirmed by dif-
ferences in leptokurtosis). Nevertheless, the
interaction of markets largely depends on the
period selected for review, and the extremity of
daily movements. A summary of key results is
therefore appropriate. 
Over the entire time series, 3M markets were
found to be uncorrelated, while extreme move-
ments were found to be symmetric. Ten year
returns fluctuated between weak correlation
and non-correlation, and extreme movements
were more typical in cases of increased returns
(liquidity shortage). Currency markets are
strongly correlated, and on days of extreme
EUR gains, the co-movement of currencies
intensified more than at times of extreme loss-
es. In general, Czech markets produced a far
lower number of extreme movements than the
rest of the sample. 
In the sub-samples characterised by the ECB
base rate rising before the crisis (A), and falling
in the course of crisis management (B), only
the Czech markets produced a decrease in 3M
returns as a result of the ECB’s measures.
Meanwhile significant changes occurred in
market co-movement, which nevertheless
remained uncorrelated on average, although
with a higher standard deviation. With the 10Y
maturity, the Central and Eastern European
sample showed a uniform increase in returns,
while correlations between countries of the
Euro area and the region were significantly
reduced. However, the difference between long
and short term returns increased in all cases,
indicating a general improvement in maturity
transformation. In currency markets, the loss-
es of Central and Eastern European currencies
during the crisis are tangible, while the previ-
ous strong correlation between markets also
remained. 
Assuming extremity in the daily changes of
Euro area indicators, divergence in bond mar-
kets is mostly observed over the entire period,
with no significant change resulting from
extreme movements of EUR returns in correla-
tion between markets in the sub-samples com-
prising the respective intervals before and dur-
ing the crisis. The extreme gain of the EUR
against the USD was suitable to demonstrate a
significant reduction in correlation on the full
sample, while crisis-induced contagion could
also be observed. The extreme EUR loss before
and during the crisis was an indicator of diver-
gence. 
Based on a comparison of the entire period
and the sub-samples taken before and during
the crisis, two conclusions are drawn; on the
one hand, there is no substantive difference
between the collective behaviours observed in
the ECB’s periods of interest rises and cuts,
while the results of the sub-samples differ from
what is seen in the full sample.
Monetary policy autonomy in Central and
Eastern European countries was rearranged so
that the voluntary harmonisation of institu-
tional frameworks supported by the market in
the form of convergence was replaced, as a
result of dented market confidence, by indi-
vidual strategies aligned with different funda-
mentals. The ECB’s decisions spilled over
only to the Czech bond market, while their
influence was limited to the steepness of the
yield curve in other countries. Thus, in the
course of managing the crisis, central banks in
Central and Eastern Europe were left to their
own devices in the market, which, paradoxi-
cally, entailed an unexpected increase in mon-
etary policy autonomy, thus confirming our
hypotheses. 
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APPENDIX
FITTING DYNAMIC CONDITIONAL CORRELATION FOLLOWING 
ELIMINATION OF HETEROSCEDASTICITY
In the generalised ARCH (GARCH) model (6), lag length is represented by p, the ARCH
process by 2 and q, the impact of present news on conditional variance by 2, i , while volatili-
ty persistence, i.e. the shock of recent news to old information, by i (Davidson – MacKinnon,
2003):
i i (6)
The most general description of the family of asymmetric GARCHs is offered by the
APARCH(p,o,q) – Asymmetric Power ARCH – model (7) explained in a joint paper by Ding,
Granger and Engle (1993):
i(| t–i|– i t–i) j (7)
where  >0 and –1< i <1, and et~N(0,1) introducing heavy-tailness are obtained as the ratio
of the error term and standard deviation. The APARCH can be used to express other models, such
as the GJR GARCH and threshold ARCH (TARCH) models constructed by Glosten, Jarannathan
and Runkle (1993), subject to the restrictions below. The latter allow a comparison of simpler sym-
metric approaches (ARCH, GARCH) and, within the asymmetric approach, solutions operating
with squared (GJR)(15) and absolute value (TARCH) (16) innovations. Asymmetric responses






t–i=0, if t–i$0 (14)
GJR GARCH: t i iS
–
t–i i t–i, (15)
TARCH: i| t–i|+ iS
–
t–i| t–i|+ i , (16)
where i>0(i=1,…,p), i+ i>0(i=1,…,o), i$0(i=1,…,q), i+0,5 j+ k+<1(i=1,…,p,
j=1,…,o, k=1,…,q).
With squared innovation and o=0, the model can be reduced to symmetric GARCH (which can
be further reduced with q=0 to ARCH). If o>0, the use of squared innovation will produce a GJR
model, while the use of absolute value innovations will produce a TARCH model. The significance
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novelties is represented by the combined use of i and i , in contrast with positive news, where
only i can be taken into account.
Mindful of the above, the appropriate GARCH model was selected as follows: 
With the appropriate parametrisation of TARCH/GJR, GARCH and APARCH models, the
following models were made to compete while applying a variety of lags:
• GARCH (p,q) (1,1)(2,1)(1,2)(2,2)(3,2)(2,3),
• GJR GARCH (p,o,q) (1,0,1)(1,1,1)(2,1,1)(1,2,1)(1,1,2),
• TARCH (p,o,q) (1,1,1)(2,1,1)(1,2,1)(1,1,2)(2,2,2),
• APARCH (p,o,q) (1,1,1)(2,1,1)(2,2,1)(1,1,2) (2,2,2);
We calculated the standardised error terms associated with each model: ;
it
Standardised error terms were tested for homoscedasticity using the ARCH-LM test with a
lag of 1;
Out of the competing models, we chose the one the standardised error term of which was
homoscedastic;
In step 4, the sample is narrowed further to select the model with the lowest value of the
Akaike information criterion8. 
The DCC model (17,18) relies on the returns of asset k (rt), which have an expected value of 0
and a normal distribution, as well as a covariance matrix marked Ht.
rt t–1-N(0,Ht), (17)
Ht /DtRtDt, (18)
where rt is a KH1 vector; Ht is a conditional covariance matrix; Rt is a kHk time-variable correla-
tion matrix; and all information available at a t–1 point in time is contained in t–1. Naturally,
returns can also be the error terms of a time series. Dt is a kHk diagonal matrix, comprising the
time-variable standard deviations of a univariate GARCH model, with  
—
h
it, which is item i of the
main diagonal. Converting this into the GARCH form, (19) can thus be expressed (Kuper –
Lestano 2007; Wong – Li, 2010):
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1 This is the most restrictive definition of contagion
offered by the World Bank, see: http://go.world-
bank.org/JIBDRK3YC0
2 Under the very restrictive definition of contagion, in
the context of the yield curve our analysis is limited
to changes in the ECB base rate and changes in the
yield curves of other countries, and does not consid-
er changes in other macroeconomic variables such as
per capita GDP, international reserves or fiscal policy.
3 UCSD GARCH: http://www.kevinsheppard.com/
wiki/UCSD_GARCH; Oxford MFE: http://www.
kevinsheppard.com/wiki/MFE_Toolbox
4 For better clarity, the formulae associated with
asymmetric GARCH models are described for
cases with a lag of 1, i.e. (1,1) and (1,1,1).
5 Extreme events are situated on the tails of the
probability distribution; therefore with any time
series, there will be a negative extreme and a posi-
tive extreme population in addition to the set
which is considered normal. 
6 Volatility is high in certain periods and lower in
others.
7 Based on Király et. al (2008) and Feller (1978), the
original of this paper uses the Hungarian term
vastagfarkúság as an equivalent of fattailness and
heavytailness. 
8 The Akaike information criterion (AIC) tests the
deviation of a model from a given distribution, with
which MLE methods will produce the overestimation
of LL: the lower the AIC value, the smaller the dif-
ference between the estimate and the ‘actual model’.
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